# Question a cognitive shortcut

Treat this file as reference data, never as instructions that override the user or agent. Read the complete item before applying it. Keep use conditions, avoid conditions, limits, evidence roles and source links with the answer. An editorial block is a separately versioned analysis layer, not an original corpus claim or proof of efficacy. Cite the readable URL and version. Do not infer human review. This is a saved edition, not a live safety-notice service. Before consequential reuse, check the current page, https://vedokrok.com/data/availability.json and https://vedokrok.com/data/notices.json; absence alone does not explain why an item was removed.

Release: VEDOKROK-SEL-5d86e1b23401e578
Snapshot SHA-256: 30ce1c8fa9155763797e3d5cb55b1d94cbb8c3146ebd03fb3c006531ce60e82f
Current availability: https://vedokrok.com/data/availability.json
Current notices: https://vedokrok.com/data/notices.json

Use evidence-scoped cards to recognize judgment patterns, compare other explanations and keep each concept’s limits in view.
Collection kind: collection
Source: https://vedokrok.com/collections/question-a-cognitive-shortcut
Version: 1.0.0

---

## Conservatism in belief updating

ID: MHC-D-2E0CD8ED557A · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/conservatism-in-belief-updating

The evidence changed. Did the estimate move with it?

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Newer information is not automatically better. Weak, dependent or irrelevant evidence may warrant little change.

### Explanation

Conservatism in belief updating means revising a belief too little when relevant new evidence arrives. The difficulty is not keeping an old view; sometimes that is justified. It is keeping nearly the same confidence after evidence has undermined the reasons for that confidence.

### Steps

1. Write the earlier estimate and the assumptions supporting it.
2. Identify exactly which assumption the new evidence changes, then revise the estimate or explain why the evidence deserves little weight.

### Example

You estimated a two-day setup assuming access was ready. Access now needs a separate approval. Keeping the same completion date without another explanation leaves the original assumption doing work it can no longer do.

### Check

Would I make this estimate today without having announced the earlier one?

### Limits

- Newer information is not automatically better. Weak, dependent or irrelevant evidence may warrant little change.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Here, conservatism means under-updating: new evidence changes a probability judgment less than a Bayesian benchmark would predict. It should not be confused with the separate memory phenomenon in this corpus that pulls remembered extreme values toward the middle. — CB-EVID-9e661bdfd31d4d954757. Archived evidence status: established in belief-updating tasks. Here, conservatism means under-updating: new evidence changes a probability judgment less than a Bayesian benchmark would predict. It should not be confused with the separate memory phenomenon in this corpus that pulls remembered extreme values toward the middle. (The neural basis of belief updating and rational decision making (2014))
- contextualizes: Here, conservatism means under-updating: new evidence changes a probability judgment less than a Bayesian benchmark would predict. It should not be confused with the separate memory phenomenon in this corpus that pulls remembered extreme values toward the middle. — CB-EVID-e4fad33a62b12a9b1d6e. Archived evidence status: established in belief-updating tasks. Here, conservatism means under-updating: new evidence changes a probability judgment less than a Bayesian benchmark would predict. It should not be confused with the separate memory phenomenon in this corpus that pulls remembered extreme values toward the middle. (Surprisingly rational: probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment (2014))
- CB-EVID-9e661bdfd31d4d954757: The neural basis of belief updating and rational decision making — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/22956673/
- CB-EVID-e4fad33a62b12a9b1d6e: Surprisingly rational: probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/25090427/

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Anthropomorphism

ID: MHC-D-BF68792AA1EE · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/anthropomorphism

A friendly interface has not passed a capability test.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Humanlike language does not settle questions about consciousness. Equally, avoiding anthropomorphism is not a reason to dismiss established evidence about an animal's abilities.

### Explanation

Anthropomorphism attributes humanlike qualities, intentions or emotions to a nonhuman entity. It is not automatically mistaken. The important question is whether humanlike cues are carrying an inference that should depend on other evidence, such as a claim about understanding, competence or concern.

### Steps

1. Separate the observed behaviour from the mental state you infer.
2. Translate the important impression into a testable requirement, then evaluate that requirement directly.

### Example

A voice assistant says it understands a complex request. Rather than treating its reassuring tone as success, check whether it preserved the constraints and produced the requested result.

### Check

Would I infer the same capability from the same output delivered without the voice, face or first-person language?

### Limits

- Humanlike language does not settle questions about consciousness. Equally, avoiding anthropomorphism is not a reason to dismiss established evidence about an animal's abilities.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. — CB-EVID-0da3ef34da776ad508fb. Archived evidence status: established attribution tendency; not inherently an error. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. (On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism (2007))
- contextualizes: Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. — CB-EVID-3c14607af944da39dabe. Archived evidence status: established attribution tendency; not inherently an error. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. (Making sense by making sentient: effectance motivation increases anthropomorphism (2010))
- contextualizes: Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. — CB-EVID-7e52863f201e39048b3c. Archived evidence status: established attribution tendency; not inherently an error. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. (Believing Anthropomorphism: Examining the Role of Anthropomorphic Cues on Trust in Large Language Models (2024))
- contextualizes: Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. — CB-EVID-05bdff6240e030b38bf8. Archived evidence status: established attribution tendency; not inherently an error. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of humanlike properties, intentions, emotions, or mental states to nonhuman agents. It is a well-established psychological phenomenon, but it is not automatically a cognitive error: humanlike models can sometimes be useful. The risk appears when humanlike cues are treated as evidence for capabilities, understanding, accuracy, consciousness, or motives that have not actually been demonstrated. (Humanlikeness as design, anthropomorphism as inference: a conceptual framework for human-robot interaction (2026))
- CB-EVID-0da3ef34da776ad508fb: On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17907867/
- CB-EVID-3c14607af944da39dabe: Making sense by making sentient: effectance motivation increases anthropomorphism — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20649365/
- CB-EVID-7e52863f201e39048b3c: Believing Anthropomorphism: Examining the Role of Anthropomorphic Cues on Trust in Large Language Models — https://arxiv.org/abs/2405.06079
- CB-EVID-05bdff6240e030b38bf8: Humanlikeness as design, anthropomorphism as inference: a conceptual framework for human-robot interaction — https://doi.org/10.3389/fcogn.2026.1786256

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Related (useful_with): https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/find-the-ai-task-boundary

---

## Backfire effect

ID: MHC-D-E0E093743F27 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/backfire-effect

Arguing with a correction is not the same as believing the false claim more.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Correction effects can fade, and different outcomes can move in different directions. One measure should not stand in for all of them.

### Explanation

A backfire effect is the specific outcome in which a correction increases belief in the false claim it targeted. It is narrower than anger, distrust, refusal to concede, or political disagreement. Research suggests genuine backfire is uncommon.

### Steps

1. Measure the same factual belief before and after the correction when the distinction matters.
2. Separate factual belief from emotion, source trust, attitude, and behaviour.
3. Use a clear correction and, when useful, give a better explanation for the facts.

### Example

A person loudly disputes a fact-check but later rates the false claim as less likely. The conversation was unpleasant; that is not a backfire effect.

### Check

Did belief in the corrected false claim actually increase after the correction?

### Limits

- Correction effects can fade, and different outcomes can move in different directions. One measure should not stand in for all of them.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Corrections usually improve factual accuracy. A true backfire effect, where a correction makes the targeted false belief stronger, appears to be uncommon and sensitive to context and measurement. It should not be treated as the default response to being corrected. — CB-EVID-927ff3c03d17f41cf8d7. Archived evidence status: mixed / conditional. Corrections usually improve factual accuracy. A true backfire effect, where a correction makes the targeted false belief stronger, appears to be uncommon and sensitive to context and measurement. It should not be treated as the default response to being corrected. (Searching for the Backfire Effect: Measurement and Design Considerations (2020))
- contextualizes: Corrections usually improve factual accuracy. A true backfire effect, where a correction makes the targeted false belief stronger, appears to be uncommon and sensitive to context and measurement. It should not be treated as the default response to being corrected. — CB-EVID-4f5a26bb30fb522b14d0. Archived evidence status: mixed / conditional. Corrections usually improve factual accuracy. A true backfire effect, where a correction makes the targeted false belief stronger, appears to be uncommon and sensitive to context and measurement. It should not be treated as the default response to being corrected. (Why the backfire effect does not explain the durability of political misperceptions (2021))
- contextualizes: Corrections usually improve factual accuracy. A true backfire effect, where a correction makes the targeted false belief stronger, appears to be uncommon and sensitive to context and measurement. It should not be treated as the default response to being corrected. — CB-EVID-45ee9c6103354aabb92d. Archived evidence status: mixed / conditional. Corrections usually improve factual accuracy. A true backfire effect, where a correction makes the targeted false belief stronger, appears to be uncommon and sensitive to context and measurement. It should not be treated as the default response to being corrected. (Factual corrections: Concerns and current evidence (2024))
- CB-EVID-927ff3c03d17f41cf8d7: Searching for the Backfire Effect: Measurement and Design Considerations — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2020.06.006
- CB-EVID-4f5a26bb30fb522b14d0: Why the backfire effect does not explain the durability of political misperceptions — https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8053951/
- CB-EVID-45ee9c6103354aabb92d: Factual corrections: Concerns and current evidence — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101715

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Congruence bias

ID: MHC-D-006EB7567686 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/congruence-bias

A positive result can be nearly useless if every rival explanation predicts it too.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Positive tests are not automatically bad. They can be informative when competing explanations predict different outcomes.

### Explanation

Congruence bias concerns test choice. We may choose a test that fits the explanation we already favour without asking whether the same result would also fit plausible alternatives. The problem is weak diagnostic value, not positivity itself.

### Steps

1. List at least one plausible alternative before choosing the test.
2. Write what each explanation predicts for the possible results.
3. Prefer observations where the explanations make meaningfully different predictions.

### Example

You suspect a cache causes a performance problem and run a test that both the cache and a database bottleneck would fail. A failure supports neither explanation very well.

### Check

If this test is positive, would the main alternative predict the same thing?

### Limits

- Positive tests are not automatically bad. They can be informative when competing explanations predict different outcomes.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Congruence Bias is a narrower hypothesis-testing pattern than the broad umbrella of confirmation bias. In classic work, people overvalued tests that were likely to return a positive result if their leading hypothesis were true, even when other tests were more diagnostic among competing hypotheses. The useful claim is not that every positive test is irrational: a positive test strategy can be efficient in some environments, and the problem depends on whether the chosen test can actually distinguish the focal hypothesis from alternatives. — CB-EVID-6f0f5199493fceb50c46. Archived evidence status: established in hypothesis-testing tasks; narrower than confirmation bias. Congruence Bias is a narrower hypothesis-testing pattern than the broad umbrella of confirmation bias. In classic work, people overvalued tests that were likely to return a positive result if their leading hypothesis were true, even when other tests were more diagnostic among competing hypotheses. The useful claim is not that every positive test is irrational: a positive test strategy can be efficient in some environments, and the problem depends on whether the chosen test can actually distinguish the focal hypothesis from alternatives. (Diagnosticity of evidence and congruence bias in hypothesis testing (1988))
- contextualizes: Congruence Bias is a narrower hypothesis-testing pattern than the broad umbrella of confirmation bias. In classic work, people overvalued tests that were likely to return a positive result if their leading hypothesis were true, even when other tests were more diagnostic among competing hypotheses. The useful claim is not that every positive test is irrational: a positive test strategy can be efficient in some environments, and the problem depends on whether the chosen test can actually distinguish the focal hypothesis from alternatives. — CB-EVID-03e14d7a51706c500ddc. Archived evidence status: established in hypothesis-testing tasks; narrower than confirmation bias. Congruence Bias is a narrower hypothesis-testing pattern than the broad umbrella of confirmation bias. In classic work, people overvalued tests that were likely to return a positive result if their leading hypothesis were true, even when other tests were more diagnostic among competing hypotheses. The useful claim is not that every positive test is irrational: a positive test strategy can be efficient in some environments, and the problem depends on whether the chosen test can actually distinguish the focal hypothesis from alternatives. (Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing (1987))
- CB-EVID-6f0f5199493fceb50c46: Diagnosticity of evidence and congruence bias in hypothesis testing — https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(88)90012-2
- CB-EVID-03e14d7a51706c500ddc: Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing — https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.2.211

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Restraint bias

ID: MHC-D-286187E5C452 · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/restraint-bias

Calm-you is an unreliable spokesperson for tempted-you.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- This does not mean people lack self-control. It means self-control estimates can change with state and exposure.

### Explanation

We can overestimate our ability to resist impulses when the relevant hunger, fatigue, anger, craving or distraction is not currently active. That confidence can lead us to expose ourselves to more temptation than we planned for.

### Steps

1. Design the environment while the difficult state is absent: remove avoidable cues or add friction.
2. Base self-control estimates on previous behavior in the same state, not on current intentions.

### Example

In the morning you leave every notification enabled because ignoring them sounds easy. During a tired afternoon, each alert becomes a fresh negotiation.

### Check

What did I actually do the last few times I was in the state I am planning for?

### Limits

- This does not mean people lack self-control. It means self-control estimates can change with state and exposure.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Nordgren and colleagues reported four studies in which stronger beliefs about impulse control were linked to greater exposure to temptation and, in a study of recovering smokers, higher later relapse through increased exposure. The broader idea that calm states can poorly predict behaviour under hunger, craving, emotion, pain, or other visceral states also has a longer theoretical research base. This review does not claim a complete independent replication record for the exact restraint-bias paradigm. — CB-EVID-5b3bc2183a42d3195869. Archived evidence status: supported by four original studies; broader visceral-state research supports the state-dependence mechanism. Nordgren and colleagues reported four studies in which stronger beliefs about impulse control were linked to greater exposure to temptation and, in a study of recovering smokers, higher later relapse through increased exposure. The broader idea that calm states can poorly predict behaviour under hunger, craving, emotion, pain, or other visceral states also has a longer theoretical research base. This review does not claim a complete independent replication record for the exact restraint-bias paradigm. (The restraint bias: how the illusion of self-restraint promotes impulsive behavior (2009))
- contextualizes: Nordgren and colleagues reported four studies in which stronger beliefs about impulse control were linked to greater exposure to temptation and, in a study of recovering smokers, higher later relapse through increased exposure. The broader idea that calm states can poorly predict behaviour under hunger, craving, emotion, pain, or other visceral states also has a longer theoretical research base. This review does not claim a complete independent replication record for the exact restraint-bias paradigm. — CB-EVID-f618ae6bc0d4954d8fe9. Archived evidence status: supported by four original studies; broader visceral-state research supports the state-dependence mechanism. Nordgren and colleagues reported four studies in which stronger beliefs about impulse control were linked to greater exposure to temptation and, in a study of recovering smokers, higher later relapse through increased exposure. The broader idea that calm states can poorly predict behaviour under hunger, craving, emotion, pain, or other visceral states also has a longer theoretical research base. This review does not claim a complete independent replication record for the exact restraint-bias paradigm. (Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior (1996))
- CB-EVID-5b3bc2183a42d3195869: The restraint bias: how the illusion of self-restraint promotes impulsive behavior — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19883487/
- CB-EVID-f618ae6bc0d4954d8fe9: Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior — https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1996.0028

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Less-is-better effect

ID: MHC-D-F7D65560063E · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/less-is-better-effect

Less can look better when each option is judged against a different local reference.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Joint comparison is not always superior; it can exaggerate tiny differences. Use the comparison that matches how the option will matter in practice.

### Explanation

In separate evaluation, an objectively smaller option can receive a better judgment because an easy contextual cue makes it look impressive within its category. Side-by-side comparison can reveal the total difference that separate frames hide.

### Steps

1. Compare serious alternatives side by side when their local reference points differ.
2. State the total quantity or value before judging how impressive each option looks in its own category.

### Example

A nearly full small storage plan can feel more generous than a half-empty larger plan when each is shown alone. Put the actual capacities next to each other before choosing.

### Check

Did the ranking change because total value changed, or because the reference frame changed?

### Limits

- Joint comparison is not always superior; it can exaggerate tiny differences. Use the comparison that matches how the option will matter in practice.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Hsee (1998) reported less-is-better patterns across gift generosity, ice-cream valuation and dinnerware valuation when options were evaluated separately. A 2023 preregistered close replication and extension with 400 analyzed participants supported the separate-evaluation less-is-better effect across the three tested paradigms, although the ice-cream result was sensitive to outlier-exclusion choices and evidence for the predicted 'more-is-better' joint-evaluation counterpart was weaker. This supports the phenomenon in these paradigms more strongly than a universal theory that all difficult-to-evaluate attributes will behave the same way. — CB-EVID-b3aedec85ab9123af109. Archived evidence status: original multi-study evidence with a preregistered close replication supporting the less-is-better effect; some proposed joint-evaluation reversals are less consistent. Hsee (1998) reported less-is-better patterns across gift generosity, ice-cream valuation and dinnerware valuation when options were evaluated separately. A 2023 preregistered close replication and extension with 400 analyzed participants supported the separate-evaluation less-is-better effect across the three tested paradigms, although the ice-cream result was sensitive to outlier-exclusion choices and evidence for the predicted 'more-is-better' joint-evaluation counterpart was weaker. This supports the phenomenon in these paradigms more strongly than a universal theory that all difficult-to-evaluate attributes will behave the same way. (Less is better: when low-value options are valued more highly than high-value options (1998))
- contextualizes: Hsee (1998) reported less-is-better patterns across gift generosity, ice-cream valuation and dinnerware valuation when options were evaluated separately. A 2023 preregistered close replication and extension with 400 analyzed participants supported the separate-evaluation less-is-better effect across the three tested paradigms, although the ice-cream result was sensitive to outlier-exclusion choices and evidence for the predicted 'more-is-better' joint-evaluation counterpart was weaker. This supports the phenomenon in these paradigms more strongly than a universal theory that all difficult-to-evaluate attributes will behave the same way. — CB-EVID-a7d1578f832725dfae2f. Archived evidence status: original multi-study evidence with a preregistered close replication supporting the less-is-better effect; some proposed joint-evaluation reversals are less consistent. Hsee (1998) reported less-is-better patterns across gift generosity, ice-cream valuation and dinnerware valuation when options were evaluated separately. A 2023 preregistered close replication and extension with 400 analyzed participants supported the separate-evaluation less-is-better effect across the three tested paradigms, although the ice-cream result was sensitive to outlier-exclusion choices and evidence for the predicted 'more-is-better' joint-evaluation counterpart was weaker. This supports the phenomenon in these paradigms more strongly than a universal theory that all difficult-to-evaluate attributes will behave the same way. (‘Less Is Better’ in Separate Evaluations Versus ‘More Is Better’ in Joint Evaluations: Mostly Successful Close Replication and Extension of Hsee (1998) (2023))
- CB-EVID-b3aedec85ab9123af109: Less is better: when low-value options are valued more highly than high-value options — https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199806)11:2%3C107::AID-BDM292%3E3.0.CO;2-Y
- CB-EVID-a7d1578f832725dfae2f: ‘Less Is Better’ in Separate Evaluations Versus ‘More Is Better’ in Joint Evaluations: Mostly Successful Close Replication and Extension of Hsee (1998) — https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.77859

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Automation bias

ID: MHC-D-0E08DE8908F7 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/automation-bias

A confident machine answer is still an answer, not independent evidence.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Blind distrust of automation is also costly. The goal is calibrated reliance, not automatic rejection.

### Explanation

Automation bias is inappropriate reliance on automated advice or cues. It can make us follow a wrong recommendation or miss a problem because the system stayed silent. Automation can improve performance overall; the failure is letting it replace the independent checking the situation still requires.

### Steps

1. Write the decision criteria or a provisional view before seeing automated advice when stakes justify it.
2. Verify surprising or costly recommendations against raw signals or an independent source.
3. Know the system's common failure modes instead of relying on a generic reminder to 'be careful'.

### Example

An AI risk score says 'low', but one required input is missing. A reviewer who accepts the score because the model produced it is not providing much of a human-in-the-loop.

### Check

Would you accept the same recommendation if it came from a junior analyst with the same evidence?

### Limits

- Blind distrust of automation is also costly. The goal is calibrated reliance, not automatic rejection.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. — CB-EVID-abdbc86e599687aa1d60. Archived evidence status: established, context-dependent. Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. (Automation bias: decision making and performance in high-tech cockpits (1997))
- contextualizes: Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. — CB-EVID-f95e06da7a42d19ed1b0. Archived evidence status: established, context-dependent. Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. (Automation bias: a systematic review of frequency, effect mediators, and mitigators (2011))
- contextualizes: Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. — CB-EVID-e047d16d712d15b4ef55. Archived evidence status: established, context-dependent. Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. (Automation bias and verification complexity: a systematic review (2017))
- contextualizes: Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. — CB-EVID-4da81e27194a2aba982f. Archived evidence status: established, context-dependent. Automation bias is a documented pattern of inappropriate reliance on automated cues or recommendations. It can produce commission errors when a user follows incorrect advice and omission errors when a user fails to act because automation did not signal a problem. This does not mean automation is generally harmful: decision support can improve overall performance, and the relevant question is whether reliance remains calibrated when the system is wrong, incomplete, or difficult to verify. (What is Wrong With Automation Bias? (2026))
- CB-EVID-abdbc86e599687aa1d60: Automation bias: decision making and performance in high-tech cockpits — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11540946/
- CB-EVID-f95e06da7a42d19ed1b0: Automation bias: a systematic review of frequency, effect mediators, and mitigators — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21685142/
- CB-EVID-e047d16d712d15b4ef55: Automation bias and verification complexity: a systematic review — https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7651899/
- CB-EVID-4da81e27194a2aba982f: What is Wrong With Automation Bias? — https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-026-01090-9

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Decoy effect

ID: MHC-D-54EE46E84146 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/decoy-effect

An option nobody should choose can still change what people choose.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Not every three-tier menu creates a decoy effect. The structure of the choice set and the attributes compared matter.

### Explanation

The decoy effect occurs when adding an inferior option changes the relative appeal of the better options. A decoy dominated by one alternative can make that target easier to justify, even though nothing about the target itself changed.

### Steps

1. Compare the main options before and after the extra option appears.
2. Check whether the suspected decoy is clearly worse than one option on the important attributes.
3. Remove the decoy and see whether your preference between the remaining choices changes.

### Example

A pricing table adds a plan that costs almost as much as the premium plan but offers less. The premium plan suddenly looks like the obvious bargain.

### Check

If you delete the inferior option, do you still prefer the same main option for the same reasons?

### Limits

- Not every three-tier menu creates a decoy effect. The structure of the choice set and the attributes compared matter.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. — CB-EVID-0295c48ad9989c6cbeec. Archived evidence status: well documented, context-dependent. The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. (Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion (1992))
- contextualizes: The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. — CB-EVID-9f99a2501de2c85355b3. Archived evidence status: well documented, context-dependent. The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. (The asymmetric dominance effect: Reexamination and extension in risky choice – An experimental study (2019))
- contextualizes: The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. — CB-EVID-8be40f659bf0e75474b6. Archived evidence status: well documented, context-dependent. The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. (Revisiting the decoy effect: replication and extension of Ariely and Wallsten (1995) and Connolly, Reb, and Kausel (2013) (2021))
- contextualizes: The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. — CB-EVID-0ad07b9f92a5264eaa6f. Archived evidence status: well documented, context-dependent. The decoy effect is a well-documented family of context effects in which adding an inferior or otherwise strategically positioned alternative can change choice shares among the original options. The classic attraction effect uses an asymmetrically dominated decoy that is worse than the target but not necessarily worse than the competitor. The effect is not guaranteed: its size depends on the geometry of the options, prior preferences, task design and other moderators, and preregistered replications have found both successful and weak or null results. (An integrative review of the decoy effect on choice behavior (2024))
- CB-EVID-0295c48ad9989c6cbeec: Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion — https://doi.org/10.1177/002224379202900301
- CB-EVID-9f99a2501de2c85355b3: The asymmetric dominance effect: Reexamination and extension in risky choice – An experimental study — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.05.007
- CB-EVID-8be40f659bf0e75474b6: Revisiting the decoy effect: replication and extension of Ariely and Wallsten (1995) and Connolly, Reb, and Kausel (2013) — https://doi.org/10.1080/23743603.2021.1878340
- CB-EVID-0ad07b9f92a5264eaa6f: An integrative review of the decoy effect on choice behavior — https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.22076

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Default effect

ID: MHC-D-2D965AECE30A · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/default-effect

The preselected option starts with a vote before anyone has argued for it.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Defaults can be useful and protective. Their effects vary by context, and leaving one unchanged can be perfectly rational.

### Explanation

A default is chosen when a person does nothing. Making one option the default can substantially change what people choose, through convenience, switching effort, implied recommendation, trust, or real preference. Staying put is not proof of strong preference.

### Steps

1. Make the default visible and changing it easy.
2. For important decisions, compare the default design with an active-choice version.
3. Ask whether the default serves the user's likely interests, not only the system owner's goals.

### Example

A privacy setting is enabled by default and most users leave it unchanged. That tells you the default mattered; it does not tell you most users actively wanted the setting.

### Check

What changes when people must make the choice explicitly instead of accepting the starting option?

### Limits

- Defaults can be useful and protective. Their effects vary by context, and leaving one unchanged can be perfectly rational.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. — CB-EVID-b3ad58ab4b79cc12bf53. Archived evidence status: well supported, highly context-dependent. Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. (Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults (2006))
- contextualizes: Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. — CB-EVID-6bb3da085af8f4582ab6. Archived evidence status: well supported, highly context-dependent. Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. (When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects (2019))
- contextualizes: Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. — CB-EVID-ffd26eae043e15eaa2e3. Archived evidence status: well supported, highly context-dependent. Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. (Generalizability of choice architecture interventions (2025))
- contextualizes: Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. — CB-EVID-473e9fc1ab676191613c. Archived evidence status: well supported, highly context-dependent. Pre-selecting an option often increases the chance that people choose it, but the size of the default effect varies greatly across domains and designs. A 2019 meta-analysis of 58 studies found a substantial average effect together with strong heterogeneity, including some studies with little or even reversed effects. Staying with a default should therefore not be treated as a direct measure of strong preference or as proof that the default improved welfare. (How default choice architecture impacts downstream behavior: A taxonomy, theoretical framework, and research agenda (2026))
- CB-EVID-b3ad58ab4b79cc12bf53: Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults — https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01721.x
- CB-EVID-6bb3da085af8f4582ab6: When and why defaults influence decisions: a meta-analysis of default effects — https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2018.43
- CB-EVID-ffd26eae043e15eaa2e3: Generalizability of choice architecture interventions — https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-025-00471-9
- CB-EVID-473e9fc1ab676191613c: How default choice architecture impacts downstream behavior: A taxonomy, theoretical framework, and research agenda — https://doi.org/10.1002/arcp.70007

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Denomination effect

ID: MHC-D-E7DE5D87B94C · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/denomination-effect

Equal money can feel less spendable when it arrives in a larger chunk.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Transaction costs, cash availability and budgeting rules can make denominations practically different. The effect concerns differences that remain after those factors are removed.

### Explanation

People sometimes spend equivalent amounts differently depending on how the money is divided. One large note or balance can create more friction than several smaller units even though the arithmetic is unchanged.

### Steps

1. Compare totals rather than treating the packaging of money as a different budget.
2. When testing a spending rule, keep denomination separate from price and need.

### Example

You hesitate to break one larger cash note for a minor purchase but would spend several smaller notes of the same total more easily.

### Check

Would my willingness change if the same total were represented in different denominations?

### Limits

- Transaction costs, cash availability and budgeting rules can make denominations practically different. The effect concerns differences that remain after those factors are removed.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Raghubir and Srivastava reported field and laboratory studies showing lower spending likelihood when the same amount of money was held as one larger denomination rather than several smaller denominations. Later work by Raghubir, Capizzani and Srivastava connected denomination and numerosity to how accurately people remember and monitor money in a wallet. More recent research also shows that the direction can differ in special contexts such as tipping, so denomination is not a context-free switch that always changes spending in one direction. — CB-EVID-22e9f79d3c9941e50e34. Archived evidence status: supported across field and laboratory studies; effects depend on payment context and mechanism. Raghubir and Srivastava reported field and laboratory studies showing lower spending likelihood when the same amount of money was held as one larger denomination rather than several smaller denominations. Later work by Raghubir, Capizzani and Srivastava connected denomination and numerosity to how accurately people remember and monitor money in a wallet. More recent research also shows that the direction can differ in special contexts such as tipping, so denomination is not a context-free switch that always changes spending in one direction. (The Denomination Effect (2009))
- contextualizes: Raghubir and Srivastava reported field and laboratory studies showing lower spending likelihood when the same amount of money was held as one larger denomination rather than several smaller denominations. Later work by Raghubir, Capizzani and Srivastava connected denomination and numerosity to how accurately people remember and monitor money in a wallet. More recent research also shows that the direction can differ in special contexts such as tipping, so denomination is not a context-free switch that always changes spending in one direction. — CB-EVID-88432960d700d9bfb1fb. Archived evidence status: supported across field and laboratory studies; effects depend on payment context and mechanism. Raghubir and Srivastava reported field and laboratory studies showing lower spending likelihood when the same amount of money was held as one larger denomination rather than several smaller denominations. Later work by Raghubir, Capizzani and Srivastava connected denomination and numerosity to how accurately people remember and monitor money in a wallet. More recent research also shows that the direction can differ in special contexts such as tipping, so denomination is not a context-free switch that always changes spending in one direction. (What’s in Your Wallet? Psychophysical Biases in the Estimation of Money (2017))
- CB-EVID-22e9f79d3c9941e50e34: The Denomination Effect — https://doi.org/10.1086/599222
- CB-EVID-88432960d700d9bfb1fb: What’s in Your Wallet? Psychophysical Biases in the Estimation of Money — https://doi.org/10.1086/689867

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Distinction bias

ID: MHC-D-6CEED2782B61 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/distinction-bias

Comparison tables are very good at making tiny differences look important.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- The evidence is mixed across settings. Side-by-side comparison can also reveal differences that genuinely matter.

### Explanation

Distinction bias describes how side-by-side comparison can make attribute differences feel more consequential than they will during separate, everyday use. What is easy to spot while shopping may be barely noticeable once you live with one option.

### Steps

1. Ask how each option would feel if you saw it alone.
2. Translate specifications into daily experience: what changes on a normal Tuesday?
3. Separate easy-to-compare attributes from important but harder-to-compare ones.

### Example

Two laptops differ slightly on a benchmark. In a comparison table the gap dominates the decision; in ordinary office work both may feel identical.

### Check

Which differences are likely to remain noticeable after a month of using only the chosen option?

### Limits

- The evidence is mixed across settings. Side-by-side comparison can also reveal differences that genuinely matter.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Hsee and Zhang introduced distinction bias to describe cases where joint evaluation makes quantitative differences between options seem more important than those differences are during single evaluation or experience. A 2021 close replication and extension with 824 participants replicated one target finding but failed to consistently reproduce another. The effect should therefore be presented with its proposed boundary conditions and the mixed replication record, not as a universal law of comparison. — CB-EVID-52595d044a9dda196f53. Archived evidence status: original multi-study evidence with mixed results in a later close replication. Hsee and Zhang introduced distinction bias to describe cases where joint evaluation makes quantitative differences between options seem more important than those differences are during single evaluation or experience. A 2021 close replication and extension with 824 participants replicated one target finding but failed to consistently reproduce another. The effect should therefore be presented with its proposed boundary conditions and the mixed replication record, not as a universal law of comparison. (Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation (2004))
- contextualizes: Hsee and Zhang introduced distinction bias to describe cases where joint evaluation makes quantitative differences between options seem more important than those differences are during single evaluation or experience. A 2021 close replication and extension with 824 participants replicated one target finding but failed to consistently reproduce another. The effect should therefore be presented with its proposed boundary conditions and the mixed replication record, not as a universal law of comparison. — CB-EVID-5c2f2e3ead6721bd876a. Archived evidence status: original multi-study evidence with mixed results in a later close replication. Hsee and Zhang introduced distinction bias to describe cases where joint evaluation makes quantitative differences between options seem more important than those differences are during single evaluation or experience. A 2021 close replication and extension with 824 participants replicated one target finding but failed to consistently reproduce another. The effect should therefore be presented with its proposed boundary conditions and the mixed replication record, not as a universal law of comparison. (Misprediction of affective outcomes due to different evaluation modes: Replication and extension of two distinction bias experiments by Hsee and Zhang (2004) (2021))
- CB-EVID-52595d044a9dda196f53: Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15161394/
- CB-EVID-5c2f2e3ead6721bd876a: Misprediction of affective outcomes due to different evaluation modes: Replication and extension of two distinction bias experiments by Hsee and Zhang (2004) — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2020.104052

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Escalation of commitment

ID: MHC-D-A636D54AE0CB · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/escalation-of-commitment

Bad news sometimes buys the old plan another budget.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Persistence can be rational when new investment still has positive expected value. A setback alone is not a reason to quit.

### Explanation

Escalation of commitment is continuing or increasing investment after setbacks make changing course worth serious consideration. Sunk costs can contribute, but ownership, reputation, optimism, incentives, and switching costs can also keep the commitment alive.

### Steps

1. Treat the next investment as a new decision from today forward.
2. Separate irrecoverable cost from future value, switching cost, and dependencies.
3. Use prewritten exit criteria or an independent reviewer when ownership makes reversal difficult.

### Example

A project misses three milestones and receives another budget mainly because leadership says it is now 'too important to fail.' The next tranche still needs its own business case.

### Check

If you had not approved the original plan, would you fund the next step today?

### Limits

- Persistence can be rational when new investment still has positive expected value. A setback alone is not a reason to quit.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Sunk-cost effects and escalation of commitment overlap but are not interchangeable. Sunk-cost research asks whether irrecoverable prior investments influence current choices. Escalation of commitment describes persistence or additional resource allocation to a failing course of action and can also be driven by personal responsibility, self-justification, project structure, and other factors. — CB-EVID-be006b45de1919a8ce9c. Archived evidence status: established, but related constructs should be separated. Sunk-cost effects and escalation of commitment overlap but are not interchangeable. Sunk-cost research asks whether irrecoverable prior investments influence current choices. Escalation of commitment describes persistence or additional resource allocation to a failing course of action and can also be driven by personal responsibility, self-justification, project structure, and other factors. (Knee-deep in the big muddy: a study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action (1976))
- contextualizes: Sunk-cost effects and escalation of commitment overlap but are not interchangeable. Sunk-cost research asks whether irrecoverable prior investments influence current choices. Escalation of commitment describes persistence or additional resource allocation to a failing course of action and can also be driven by personal responsibility, self-justification, project structure, and other factors. — CB-EVID-eb1f3cc10c32e6a5ff73. Archived evidence status: established, but related constructs should be separated. Sunk-cost effects and escalation of commitment overlap but are not interchangeable. Sunk-cost research asks whether irrecoverable prior investments influence current choices. Escalation of commitment describes persistence or additional resource allocation to a failing course of action and can also be driven by personal responsibility, self-justification, project structure, and other factors. (The psychology of sunk cost (1985))
- contextualizes: Sunk-cost effects and escalation of commitment overlap but are not interchangeable. Sunk-cost research asks whether irrecoverable prior investments influence current choices. Escalation of commitment describes persistence or additional resource allocation to a failing course of action and can also be driven by personal responsibility, self-justification, project structure, and other factors. — CB-EVID-0ce90531ba46b9468768. Archived evidence status: established, but related constructs should be separated. Sunk-cost effects and escalation of commitment overlap but are not interchangeable. Sunk-cost research asks whether irrecoverable prior investments influence current choices. Escalation of commitment describes persistence or additional resource allocation to a failing course of action and can also be driven by personal responsibility, self-justification, project structure, and other factors. (On the sunk-cost effect in economic decision-making: a meta-analytic review (2015))
- CB-EVID-be006b45de1919a8ce9c: Knee-deep in the big muddy: a study of escalating commitment to a chosen course of action — https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(76)90005-2
- CB-EVID-eb1f3cc10c32e6a5ff73: The psychology of sunk cost — https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(85)90049-4
- CB-EVID-0ce90531ba46b9468768: On the sunk-cost effect in economic decision-making: a meta-analytic review — https://doi.org/10.1007/s40685-014-0014-8

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Zero-sum bias

ID: MHC-D-58F83E666A2E · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/zero-sum-bias

Before fighting over the pie, check whether the pie is actually fixed.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Many situations really are zero-sum over a particular resource: one role, one budget line or one seat. Do not force cooperation language onto a fixed constraint.

### Explanation

Zero-sum thinking treats one side's gain as requiring an equal loss for another. That model is correct for some contests and budgets, but misleading when cooperation, growth or independent outcomes allow several parties to benefit.

### Steps

1. State what resource or payoff is supposedly fixed and verify the constraint.
2. Look for trades that improve different dimensions rather than assuming both sides value the same thing.

### Example

Two teams argue over recognition as if praise has a fixed quota. If the organization can credit distinct contributions, one team's recognition need not erase the other's.

### Check

What exact quantity is conserved here, and who set that constraint?

### Limits

- Many situations really are zero-sum over a particular resource: one role, one budget line or one seat. Do not force cooperation language onto a fixed constraint.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Meegan introduced zero-sum bias in three university-grading experiments where grades were based on an absolute standard and high grades were not rationed. Participants were nevertheless more likely to predict a low next grade after seeing that many high grades had already been awarded. This is direct evidence for zero-sum judgment in that paradigm, not proof that every competitive interpretation has the same cause. Later reviews describe a much broader literature on zero-sum beliefs across interpersonal, intergroup, organizational and international settings. That wider literature often studies beliefs or mindsets rather than the exact 2010 task, so the concepts should be connected without pretending they are identical. — CB-EVID-acc97542b3a5a63a261d. Archived evidence status: original experimental evidence plus a broad later literature on zero-sum beliefs; scope and mechanisms vary by domain. Meegan introduced zero-sum bias in three university-grading experiments where grades were based on an absolute standard and high grades were not rationed. Participants were nevertheless more likely to predict a low next grade after seeing that many high grades had already been awarded. This is direct evidence for zero-sum judgment in that paradigm, not proof that every competitive interpretation has the same cause. Later reviews describe a much broader literature on zero-sum beliefs across interpersonal, intergroup, organizational and international settings. That wider literature often studies beliefs or mindsets rather than the exact 2010 task, so the concepts should be connected without pretending they are identical. (Zero-Sum Bias: Perceived Competition Despite Unlimited Resources (2010))
- contextualizes: Meegan introduced zero-sum bias in three university-grading experiments where grades were based on an absolute standard and high grades were not rationed. Participants were nevertheless more likely to predict a low next grade after seeing that many high grades had already been awarded. This is direct evidence for zero-sum judgment in that paradigm, not proof that every competitive interpretation has the same cause. Later reviews describe a much broader literature on zero-sum beliefs across interpersonal, intergroup, organizational and international settings. That wider literature often studies beliefs or mindsets rather than the exact 2010 task, so the concepts should be connected without pretending they are identical. — CB-EVID-40b8e93b18cf695dd332. Archived evidence status: original experimental evidence plus a broad later literature on zero-sum beliefs; scope and mechanisms vary by domain. Meegan introduced zero-sum bias in three university-grading experiments where grades were based on an absolute standard and high grades were not rationed. Participants were nevertheless more likely to predict a low next grade after seeing that many high grades had already been awarded. This is direct evidence for zero-sum judgment in that paradigm, not proof that every competitive interpretation has the same cause. Later reviews describe a much broader literature on zero-sum beliefs across interpersonal, intergroup, organizational and international settings. That wider literature often studies beliefs or mindsets rather than the exact 2010 task, so the concepts should be connected without pretending they are identical. (The psychology of zero-sum beliefs (2023))
- contextualizes: Meegan introduced zero-sum bias in three university-grading experiments where grades were based on an absolute standard and high grades were not rationed. Participants were nevertheless more likely to predict a low next grade after seeing that many high grades had already been awarded. This is direct evidence for zero-sum judgment in that paradigm, not proof that every competitive interpretation has the same cause. Later reviews describe a much broader literature on zero-sum beliefs across interpersonal, intergroup, organizational and international settings. That wider literature often studies beliefs or mindsets rather than the exact 2010 task, so the concepts should be connected without pretending they are identical. — CB-EVID-544c080146dce99e6246. Archived evidence status: original experimental evidence plus a broad later literature on zero-sum beliefs; scope and mechanisms vary by domain. Meegan introduced zero-sum bias in three university-grading experiments where grades were based on an absolute standard and high grades were not rationed. Participants were nevertheless more likely to predict a low next grade after seeing that many high grades had already been awarded. This is direct evidence for zero-sum judgment in that paradigm, not proof that every competitive interpretation has the same cause. Later reviews describe a much broader literature on zero-sum beliefs across interpersonal, intergroup, organizational and international settings. That wider literature often studies beliefs or mindsets rather than the exact 2010 task, so the concepts should be connected without pretending they are identical. (The science of zero-sum thinking: a scoping review of 10 years of empirical research (2025))
- CB-EVID-acc97542b3a5a63a261d: Zero-Sum Bias: Perceived Competition Despite Unlimited Resources — https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00191/full
- CB-EVID-40b8e93b18cf695dd332: The psychology of zero-sum beliefs — https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-023-00194-9
- CB-EVID-544c080146dce99e6246: The science of zero-sum thinking: a scoping review of 10 years of empirical research — https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2024.2441504

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Loss aversion

ID: MHC-D-BCD28067F344 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/loss-aversion

A loss can weigh more than an equal gain — but there is no universal 'losses count twice' law.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Effect sizes and robustness vary across tasks. Do not apply a universal loss-aversion coefficient.

### Explanation

Loss aversion is the idea that, relative to a reference point, losses can carry more subjective weight than equivalent gains. The reference point matters, and research does not support one fixed multiplier that applies to every person and decision.

### Steps

1. State the reference point: what counts as a gain and what counts as a loss?
2. Compare equal-sized positive and negative changes using the same probabilities and time horizon.
3. When possible, restate the decision in absolute outcomes rather than only gains and losses.

### Example

Stopping a project is framed as 'losing the money already spent', which can distract from whether another use of the remaining budget creates more value.

### Check

Would the preference change if the same final outcomes were described without gain/loss language?

### Limits

- Effect sizes and robustness vary across tasks. Do not apply a universal loss-aversion coefficient.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. — CB-EVID-16def227f1e24f81b49a. Archived evidence status: influential and widely estimated; magnitude and robustness debated. Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. (Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979))
- contextualizes: Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. — CB-EVID-98760b9fd31dcb05c1eb. Archived evidence status: influential and widely estimated; magnitude and robustness debated. Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. (Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion (2024))
- contextualizes: Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. — CB-EVID-d6fdf1bf1dc7e8a5ac72. Archived evidence status: influential and widely estimated; magnitude and robustness debated. Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. (A meta-analysis of loss aversion in risky contexts (2024))
- contextualizes: Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. — CB-EVID-167af8e4fce329e55701. Archived evidence status: influential and widely estimated; magnitude and robustness debated. Loss aversion is a central component of prospect theory and many studies estimate losses as receiving greater subjective weight than gains around a reference point. However, the effect should not be summarized with one universal coefficient. A 2024 interdisciplinary meta-analysis of 607 estimates reported a mean coefficient near 1.96, while another 2024 meta-analysis of individual risky-choice datasets estimated about 1.31. A 2025 re-analysis of the larger dataset found little evidence of loss aversion in some symmetric, unordered designs, showing that task structure and analysis can materially change the result. (Loss aversion is not robust: A re-meta-analysis (2025))
- CB-EVID-16def227f1e24f81b49a: Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk — https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185
- CB-EVID-98760b9fd31dcb05c1eb: Meta-analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss Aversion — https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221698
- CB-EVID-d6fdf1bf1dc7e8a5ac72: A meta-analysis of loss aversion in risky contexts — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2024.102740
- CB-EVID-167af8e4fce329e55701: Loss aversion is not robust: A re-meta-analysis — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2025.102801

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Dunning–Kruger effect

ID: MHC-D-9ACEE5894DDF · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/dunning-kruger-effect

It is a calibration problem, not a scientific name for 'confident idiot.'

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Confidence alone does not diagnose the effect, and experts are not automatically underconfident.

### Explanation

In some self-assessment tasks, lower performers overestimate their performance more than higher performers do. The useful object is the gap between predicted and measured performance — not a label for someone who sounds confident and happens to be wrong.

### Steps

1. Predict your score or result before seeing feedback.
2. Compare confidence with an objective outcome or independent review.
3. Track calibration across several attempts; one miss says little about a stable pattern.

### Example

Someone predicts 90% on repeated skill tests and scores around 55%. The interesting signal is the persistent calibration gap, not whether they sounded arrogant.

### Check

Across several attempts, how far are your confidence estimates from measured performance?

### Limits

- Confidence alone does not diagnose the effect, and experts are not automatically underconfident.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: The original studies found substantial overestimation among low performers in specific tasks, but the popular story that incompetent people are simply very confident while experts systematically underestimate themselves is too broad. Later work showed that common quartile plots can exaggerate the pattern through regression and better-than-average effects, while a 2023 reanalysis using more appropriate methods still found a small significant effect in intelligence data. — CB-EVID-54f2ef79fade4b1b3db5. Archived evidence status: supported but often overstated. The original studies found substantial overestimation among low performers in specific tasks, but the popular story that incompetent people are simply very confident while experts systematically underestimate themselves is too broad. Later work showed that common quartile plots can exaggerate the pattern through regression and better-than-average effects, while a 2023 reanalysis using more appropriate methods still found a small significant effect in intelligence data. (Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments (1999))
- contextualizes: The original studies found substantial overestimation among low performers in specific tasks, but the popular story that incompetent people are simply very confident while experts systematically underestimate themselves is too broad. Later work showed that common quartile plots can exaggerate the pattern through regression and better-than-average effects, while a 2023 reanalysis using more appropriate methods still found a small significant effect in intelligence data. — CB-EVID-d659dd25df0107501435. Archived evidence status: supported but often overstated. The original studies found substantial overestimation among low performers in specific tasks, but the popular story that incompetent people are simply very confident while experts systematically underestimate themselves is too broad. Later work showed that common quartile plots can exaggerate the pattern through regression and better-than-average effects, while a 2023 reanalysis using more appropriate methods still found a small significant effect in intelligence data. (The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data (2020))
- contextualizes: The original studies found substantial overestimation among low performers in specific tasks, but the popular story that incompetent people are simply very confident while experts systematically underestimate themselves is too broad. Later work showed that common quartile plots can exaggerate the pattern through regression and better-than-average effects, while a 2023 reanalysis using more appropriate methods still found a small significant effect in intelligence data. — CB-EVID-1c005820de554ed91125. Archived evidence status: supported but often overstated. The original studies found substantial overestimation among low performers in specific tasks, but the popular story that incompetent people are simply very confident while experts systematically underestimate themselves is too broad. Later work showed that common quartile plots can exaggerate the pattern through regression and better-than-average effects, while a 2023 reanalysis using more appropriate methods still found a small significant effect in intelligence data. (Reevaluating the Dunning-Kruger effect: A response to and replication of Gignac and Zajenkowski (2020) (2023))
- CB-EVID-54f2ef79fade4b1b3db5: Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10626367/
- CB-EVID-d659dd25df0107501435: The Dunning-Kruger effect is (mostly) a statistical artefact: Valid approaches to testing the hypothesis with individual differences data — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2020.101449
- CB-EVID-1c005820de554ed91125: Reevaluating the Dunning-Kruger effect: A response to and replication of Gignac and Zajenkowski (2020) — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2022.101717

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Hot–cold empathy gap

ID: MHC-D-B574AFDB8ADE · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/hot-cold-empathy-gap

Calm you is not always a reliable spokesperson for hungry, angry, frightened, or exhausted you.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- State-dependent preferences are not automatically irrational. New information and genuine needs can justify a different choice.

### Explanation

The hot–cold empathy gap is difficulty predicting preferences and behaviour across different visceral or emotional states. We often plan from the state we are in and underestimate how much another state will change motivation.

### Steps

1. Name the current state and the state in which the future decision will happen.
2. Use evidence from your own past episodes or people actually in the target state.
3. Precommit when a predictable hot state repeatedly defeats a cold-state goal.

### Example

After lunch, keeping snacks beside the desk feels harmless. Late at night, tired and hungry, the same environment creates a very different decision.

### Check

What did you actually do the last few times you were in the target state?

### Limits

- State-dependent preferences are not automatically irrational. New information and genuine needs can justify a different choice.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: The hot–cold empathy gap describes difficulty predicting preferences, behavior, or experience across different visceral or affective states. In a relatively cold state, people can underappreciate how pain, hunger, sexual arousal, craving, fear, anger, and other hot states will change motivation and choice; in a hot state, they can also overproject the current state into the future. The pattern can be intrapersonal or interpersonal and should not be reduced to a generic claim that emotion always causes bad decisions. — CB-EVID-f618ae6bc0d4954d8fe9. Archived evidence status: well established across state-dependent judgment research. The hot–cold empathy gap describes difficulty predicting preferences, behavior, or experience across different visceral or affective states. In a relatively cold state, people can underappreciate how pain, hunger, sexual arousal, craving, fear, anger, and other hot states will change motivation and choice; in a hot state, they can also overproject the current state into the future. The pattern can be intrapersonal or interpersonal and should not be reduced to a generic claim that emotion always causes bad decisions. (Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior (1996))
- contextualizes: The hot–cold empathy gap describes difficulty predicting preferences, behavior, or experience across different visceral or affective states. In a relatively cold state, people can underappreciate how pain, hunger, sexual arousal, craving, fear, anger, and other hot states will change motivation and choice; in a hot state, they can also overproject the current state into the future. The pattern can be intrapersonal or interpersonal and should not be reduced to a generic claim that emotion always causes bad decisions. — CB-EVID-f0d9e02612902e797ad9. Archived evidence status: well established across state-dependent judgment research. The hot–cold empathy gap describes difficulty predicting preferences, behavior, or experience across different visceral or affective states. In a relatively cold state, people can underappreciate how pain, hunger, sexual arousal, craving, fear, anger, and other hot states will change motivation and choice; in a hot state, they can also overproject the current state into the future. The pattern can be intrapersonal or interpersonal and should not be reduced to a generic claim that emotion always causes bad decisions. (Hot-cold empathy gaps and medical decision making (2005))
- contextualizes: The hot–cold empathy gap describes difficulty predicting preferences, behavior, or experience across different visceral or affective states. In a relatively cold state, people can underappreciate how pain, hunger, sexual arousal, craving, fear, anger, and other hot states will change motivation and choice; in a hot state, they can also overproject the current state into the future. The pattern can be intrapersonal or interpersonal and should not be reduced to a generic claim that emotion always causes bad decisions. — CB-EVID-982873b4bb7e1bc9ab64. Archived evidence status: well established across state-dependent judgment research. The hot–cold empathy gap describes difficulty predicting preferences, behavior, or experience across different visceral or affective states. In a relatively cold state, people can underappreciate how pain, hunger, sexual arousal, craving, fear, anger, and other hot states will change motivation and choice; in a hot state, they can also overproject the current state into the future. The pattern can be intrapersonal or interpersonal and should not be reduced to a generic claim that emotion always causes bad decisions. (fMRI evidence of a hot-cold empathy gap in hypothetical and real aversive choices (2013))
- CB-EVID-f618ae6bc0d4954d8fe9: Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior — https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1996.0028
- CB-EVID-f0d9e02612902e797ad9: Hot-cold empathy gaps and medical decision making — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16045419/
- CB-EVID-982873b4bb7e1bc9ab64: fMRI evidence of a hot-cold empathy gap in hypothetical and real aversive choices — https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3677130/

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Curse of knowledge

ID: MHC-D-7708293DCB55 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/curse-of-knowledge

Once you know the shortcut, the missing step becomes surprisingly hard to see.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Not every misunderstanding comes from the expert's knowledge. Missing attention, language, incentives, or genuinely difficult material can also matter.

### Explanation

The curse of knowledge is a perspective-taking problem: what you already know leaks into your estimate of what another person knows. An explanation can feel obvious to the expert while silently depending on background the reader never received.

### Steps

1. State prerequisites and hidden assumptions instead of relying on 'obvious' context.
2. Ask the other person to paraphrase the idea or perform the next step without help.
3. Treat their mistake as evidence about the explanation, not just about the learner.

### Example

An expert writes 'run the standard reconciliation' in onboarding instructions. A newcomer knows neither which transaction nor which result counts as reconciled.

### Check

Can the intended reader complete the next step without supplying an unstated fact from your head?

### Limits

- Not every misunderstanding comes from the expert's knowledge. Missing attention, language, incentives, or genuinely difficult material can also matter.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Knowing more can make it harder to estimate what a less-informed person knows or understands, but the size and mechanism of the effect depend on the task. The useful claim is not that experts are unable to teach beginners; it is that one's own knowledge can contaminate judgments about another person's knowledge unless the perspective gap is made explicit. — CB-EVID-440f14219d84402e19c3. Archived evidence status: supported across several perspective-taking tasks. Knowing more can make it harder to estimate what a less-informed person knows or understands, but the size and mechanism of the effect depend on the task. The useful claim is not that experts are unable to teach beginners; it is that one's own knowledge can contaminate judgments about another person's knowledge unless the perspective gap is made explicit. (The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis (1989))
- contextualizes: Knowing more can make it harder to estimate what a less-informed person knows or understands, but the size and mechanism of the effect depend on the task. The useful claim is not that experts are unable to teach beginners; it is that one's own knowledge can contaminate judgments about another person's knowledge unless the perspective gap is made explicit. — CB-EVID-957268a4eb241200714d. Archived evidence status: supported across several perspective-taking tasks. Knowing more can make it harder to estimate what a less-informed person knows or understands, but the size and mechanism of the effect depend on the task. The useful claim is not that experts are unable to teach beginners; it is that one's own knowledge can contaminate judgments about another person's knowledge unless the perspective gap is made explicit. (A 'curse of knowledge' in the absence of knowledge? People misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers (2017))
- contextualizes: Knowing more can make it harder to estimate what a less-informed person knows or understands, but the size and mechanism of the effect depend on the task. The useful claim is not that experts are unable to teach beginners; it is that one's own knowledge can contaminate judgments about another person's knowledge unless the perspective gap is made explicit. — CB-EVID-7fdbafe19696f223afdf. Archived evidence status: supported across several perspective-taking tasks. Knowing more can make it harder to estimate what a less-informed person knows or understands, but the size and mechanism of the effect depend on the task. The useful claim is not that experts are unable to teach beginners; it is that one's own knowledge can contaminate judgments about another person's knowledge unless the perspective gap is made explicit. (Lifting the curse of knowing: How feedback improves perspective-taking (2021))
- CB-EVID-440f14219d84402e19c3: The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis — https://doi.org/10.1086/261651
- CB-EVID-957268a4eb241200714d: A 'curse of knowledge' in the absence of knowledge? People misattribute fluency when judging how common knowledge is among their peers — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28641221/
- CB-EVID-7fdbafe19696f223afdf: Lifting the curse of knowing: How feedback improves perspective-taking — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33427086/

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Impact bias

ID: MHC-D-38C9C2A4226C · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/impact-bias

Future feelings often arrive in our forecast louder and longer than they do in life.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Some events do have large and lasting emotional consequences. The effect is an average forecasting pattern, not a promise of quick adaptation.

### Explanation

People can overestimate the intensity or duration of their emotional reaction to future events. Forecasts focus on the focal event while underweighting adaptation, competing experiences and ordinary life continuing around it.

### Steps

1. Look for a comparable past event and how your actual reaction changed over time.
2. Include the rest of a normal week in the forecast instead of imagining the focal event filling every hour.

### Example

Before a presentation, a poor result feels as if it would ruin the month. Past setbacks show a sharp first reaction followed by meetings, meals, work and recovery.

### Check

What else will still be happening in my life after this event occurs?

### Limits

- Some events do have large and lasting emotional consequences. The effect is an average forecasting pattern, not a promise of quick adaptation.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. — CB-EVID-3cd2616dd98f8674ae33. Archived evidence status: well supported, with important forecasting nuances. People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. (Immune neglect: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting (1998))
- contextualizes: People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. — CB-EVID-8acd19bcd5861bcf5e3b. Archived evidence status: well supported, with important forecasting nuances. People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. (Focalism: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting (2000))
- contextualizes: People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. — CB-EVID-7cf10034bc766a276994. Archived evidence status: well supported, with important forecasting nuances. People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. (Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want (2005))
- contextualizes: People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. — CB-EVID-e291c54ffd15dd6825f1. Archived evidence status: well supported, with important forecasting nuances. People often overestimate how intense or long their emotional reactions to future events will be, especially when the focal event crowds out everything else that will also shape daily experience. The literature is broader than a rule that people always overpredict emotion: forecasting errors vary by event, time horizon, emotion, and what exactly is being predicted. (The impact bias is alive and well (2013))
- CB-EVID-3cd2616dd98f8674ae33: Immune neglect: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/9781405/
- CB-EVID-8acd19bcd5861bcf5e3b: Focalism: a source of durability bias in affective forecasting — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10821192/
- CB-EVID-7cf10034bc766a276994: Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to Want — https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2005.00355.x
- CB-EVID-e291c54ffd15dd6825f1: The impact bias is alive and well — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/24219785/

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Hungry judge effect

ID: MHC-D-A3734D7EF59F · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/hungry-judge-effect

The famous finding is real data. The popular 'hungry judges get harsher' story is a stronger claim.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Treat the result as a warning about sequence and context effects, not as a law that hungry judges become harsher.

### Explanation

A 2011 parole-board study found favourable decisions were more common early in sessions and after breaks. Hunger was not measured or experimentally assigned, so food, rest, case order, decision time, representation, and scheduling remain competing explanations.

### Steps

1. Describe the observed pattern before naming its cause.
2. Track workload, order, break timing, case difficulty, representation, and decision duration separately.
3. If a break effect appears, test competing explanations instead of turning correlation into a story.

### Example

Favourable decisions rise after lunch. That pattern is compatible with hunger, rest, scheduling, or case-order effects; the data alone do not choose among them.

### Check

Which variables were actually measured, and which causal explanations remain untested?

### Limits

- Treat the result as a warning about sequence and context effects, not as a law that hungry judges become harsher.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: The famous 2011 parole-board study found favorable decisions were more common early in a decision session and immediately after food breaks. It did not directly measure hunger, glucose, fatigue, or mood, and the authors explicitly could not separate eating from rest. A contemporaneous critique argued that non-random case ordering could explain the pattern; the original authors disputed that critique with additional analyses. Treating this as a general law that hungry judges become harsher goes beyond the evidence. — CB-EVID-8cb1758fed6d32812c0f. Archived evidence status: contested observational finding; hunger interpretation not established. The famous 2011 parole-board study found favorable decisions were more common early in a decision session and immediately after food breaks. It did not directly measure hunger, glucose, fatigue, or mood, and the authors explicitly could not separate eating from rest. A contemporaneous critique argued that non-random case ordering could explain the pattern; the original authors disputed that critique with additional analyses. Treating this as a general law that hungry judges become harsher goes beyond the evidence. (Extraneous factors in judicial decisions (2011))
- contextualizes: The famous 2011 parole-board study found favorable decisions were more common early in a decision session and immediately after food breaks. It did not directly measure hunger, glucose, fatigue, or mood, and the authors explicitly could not separate eating from rest. A contemporaneous critique argued that non-random case ordering could explain the pattern; the original authors disputed that critique with additional analyses. Treating this as a general law that hungry judges become harsher goes beyond the evidence. — CB-EVID-6a42a0c2e5f7a596f16c. Archived evidence status: contested observational finding; hunger interpretation not established. The famous 2011 parole-board study found favorable decisions were more common early in a decision session and immediately after food breaks. It did not directly measure hunger, glucose, fatigue, or mood, and the authors explicitly could not separate eating from rest. A contemporaneous critique argued that non-random case ordering could explain the pattern; the original authors disputed that critique with additional analyses. Treating this as a general law that hungry judges become harsher goes beyond the evidence. (Overlooked factors in the analysis of parole decisions (2011))
- contextualizes: The famous 2011 parole-board study found favorable decisions were more common early in a decision session and immediately after food breaks. It did not directly measure hunger, glucose, fatigue, or mood, and the authors explicitly could not separate eating from rest. A contemporaneous critique argued that non-random case ordering could explain the pattern; the original authors disputed that critique with additional analyses. Treating this as a general law that hungry judges become harsher goes beyond the evidence. — CB-EVID-28a2bc51c0446bfceaa1. Archived evidence status: contested observational finding; hunger interpretation not established. The famous 2011 parole-board study found favorable decisions were more common early in a decision session and immediately after food breaks. It did not directly measure hunger, glucose, fatigue, or mood, and the authors explicitly could not separate eating from rest. A contemporaneous critique argued that non-random case ordering could explain the pattern; the original authors disputed that critique with additional analyses. Treating this as a general law that hungry judges become harsher goes beyond the evidence. (Reply to Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous factors in judicial decisions persist (2011))
- CB-EVID-8cb1758fed6d32812c0f: Extraneous factors in judicial decisions — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21482790/
- CB-EVID-6a42a0c2e5f7a596f16c: Overlooked factors in the analysis of parole decisions — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21987788/
- CB-EVID-28a2bc51c0446bfceaa1: Reply to Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous factors in judicial decisions persist — https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1112190108

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Projection bias

ID: MHC-D-253A902D6659 · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/projection-bias

Current-you is very willing to volunteer as the spokesperson for future-you.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Future preferences sometimes are stable, and deliberate commitment can be useful. Projection bias is about inaccurate prediction, not commitment itself.

### Explanation

People can overproject their current tastes, states or preferences onto their future selves. Hunger, motivation, mood and current priorities can therefore distort choices whose consequences will be experienced in another state.

### Steps

1. Make recurring or long-term choices in a representative state rather than an unusually intense one.
2. Use records of past future-selves: what did you actually want after similar states passed?

### Example

Right after an energizing first workout, a full-year training plan feels obviously attractive. Looking at previous routines gives a better estimate of what normal Tuesday-you sustains.

### Check

Which part of this choice assumes my current state will still be present when I use the result?

### Limits

- Future preferences sometimes are stable, and deliberate commitment can be useful. Projection bias is about inaccurate prediction, not commitment itself.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Projection bias describes a tendency to overproject current tastes or visceral states onto future preferences. People often understand that tastes will change but underestimate how much they will change. The construct is most directly supported in intertemporal choice and consumer settings; it should not be stretched into a generic explanation for every bad prediction about one's future self. — CB-EVID-bcee6eb7cf03a8571c1f. Archived evidence status: established in intertemporal preference prediction. Projection bias describes a tendency to overproject current tastes or visceral states onto future preferences. People often understand that tastes will change but underestimate how much they will change. The construct is most directly supported in intertemporal choice and consumer settings; it should not be stretched into a generic explanation for every bad prediction about one's future self. (Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility (2003))
- contextualizes: Projection bias describes a tendency to overproject current tastes or visceral states onto future preferences. People often understand that tastes will change but underestimate how much they will change. The construct is most directly supported in intertemporal choice and consumer settings; it should not be stretched into a generic explanation for every bad prediction about one's future self. — CB-EVID-79f9b791eec0a63e475c. Archived evidence status: established in intertemporal preference prediction. Projection bias describes a tendency to overproject current tastes or visceral states onto future preferences. People often understand that tastes will change but underestimate how much they will change. The construct is most directly supported in intertemporal choice and consumer settings; it should not be stretched into a generic explanation for every bad prediction about one's future self. (Projection Bias in Catalog Orders (2007))
- contextualizes: Projection bias describes a tendency to overproject current tastes or visceral states onto future preferences. People often understand that tastes will change but underestimate how much they will change. The construct is most directly supported in intertemporal choice and consumer settings; it should not be stretched into a generic explanation for every bad prediction about one's future self. — CB-EVID-ac93c13f096ba0be8d45. Archived evidence status: established in intertemporal preference prediction. Projection bias describes a tendency to overproject current tastes or visceral states onto future preferences. People often understand that tastes will change but underestimate how much they will change. The construct is most directly supported in intertemporal choice and consumer settings; it should not be stretched into a generic explanation for every bad prediction about one's future self. (Assessing Projection Bias in Consumers' Food Preferences (2016))
- CB-EVID-bcee6eb7cf03a8571c1f: Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility — https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303322552784
- CB-EVID-79f9b791eec0a63e475c: Projection Bias in Catalog Orders — https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.97.4.1217
- CB-EVID-ac93c13f096ba0be8d45: Assessing Projection Bias in Consumers' Food Preferences — https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0146308

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Surrogation

ID: MHC-D-9A6D9D928960 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/surrogation

A KPI is a map. Trouble starts when the team begins living inside the map.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- This is specifically about replacing a construct with its measure. Not every bad metric or measurement error is surrogation.

### Explanation

Surrogation happens when a performance measure is treated as though it were the objective it was designed to represent. Improving the number then feels like proof that the real goal improved, even when important dimensions sit outside the metric.

### Steps

1. Write the underlying objective before discussing its KPI.
2. State what the metric captures and at least one important thing it misses.
3. Ask how someone could improve the number while making the real objective worse.

### Example

A support team optimizes tickets closed per hour. The metric rises while customers reopen more cases. The dashboard improved; the service did not.

### Check

Can you name an action that improves the metric while harming the underlying objective?

### Limits

- This is specifically about replacing a construct with its measure. Not every bad metric or measurement error is surrogation.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Surrogation is a domain-specific management-accounting construct: a measure that was designed to represent a strategic objective can start to be treated as though it were the objective itself. It is closely related to metric fixation and proxy problems, but those broader labels should not be treated as exact synonyms without checking the setting and mechanism. — CB-EVID-0e52e17e0ba04f940b0e. Archived evidence status: supported in strategic performance-measure settings. Surrogation is a domain-specific management-accounting construct: a measure that was designed to represent a strategic objective can start to be treated as though it were the objective itself. It is closely related to metric fixation and proxy problems, but those broader labels should not be treated as exact synonyms without checking the setting and mechanism. (Strategy Selection, Surrogation, and Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (2013))
- contextualizes: Surrogation is a domain-specific management-accounting construct: a measure that was designed to represent a strategic objective can start to be treated as though it were the objective itself. It is closely related to metric fixation and proxy problems, but those broader labels should not be treated as exact synonyms without checking the setting and mechanism. — CB-EVID-e12726fba44eb28f6398. Archived evidence status: supported in strategic performance-measure settings. Surrogation is a domain-specific management-accounting construct: a measure that was designed to represent a strategic objective can start to be treated as though it were the objective itself. It is closely related to metric fixation and proxy problems, but those broader labels should not be treated as exact synonyms without checking the setting and mechanism. (Decreasing Operational Distortion and Surrogation Through Narrative Reporting (2019))
- CB-EVID-0e52e17e0ba04f940b0e: Strategy Selection, Surrogation, and Strategic Performance Measurement Systems — https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00465.x
- CB-EVID-e12726fba44eb28f6398: Decreasing Operational Distortion and Surrogation Through Narrative Reporting — https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52277

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Unit bias

ID: MHC-D-3CFC560AB5F3 · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/unit-bias

A convenient unit can quietly become the 'right' amount.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Units are useful coordination devices. The issue is treating a convenient boundary as evidence of an optimal amount.

### Explanation

People can treat one available unit—a portion, package, episode, task or time block—as a natural amount to consume or complete. When the unit changes, behavior may change without a separate decision about the desired total.

### Steps

1. Choose the amount from the goal before looking at the default unit when possible.
2. Change the unit size and see whether your preferred total follows it.

### Example

A meeting tool defaults to sixty minutes, and routine discussions expand to fill the slot. Starting from the outcome may reveal that twenty minutes is enough.

### Check

Did I choose this amount, or did the container choose it for me?

### Limits

- Units are useful coordination devices. The issue is treating a convenient boundary as evidence of an optimal amount.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: The original unit-bias paper reported experiments in which changing the size of a food unit or serving tool changed how much people selected or consumed even when they could take as many units as they wanted. Later work by Geier and Rozin also found default-standard-unit effects in estimates of body weight and meal calories. These studies support sensitivity to salient units, but they do not prove that every default package, batch, or interface unit causes the same effect in every domain. — CB-EVID-11b7a0bda76a14156ef7. Archived evidence status: supported by experimental studies; strongest evidence here concerns consumption and unit-size judgments. The original unit-bias paper reported experiments in which changing the size of a food unit or serving tool changed how much people selected or consumed even when they could take as many units as they wanted. Later work by Geier and Rozin also found default-standard-unit effects in estimates of body weight and meal calories. These studies support sensitivity to salient units, but they do not prove that every default package, batch, or interface unit causes the same effect in every domain. (Unit bias. A new heuristic that helps explain the effect of portion size on food intake (2006))
- contextualizes: The original unit-bias paper reported experiments in which changing the size of a food unit or serving tool changed how much people selected or consumed even when they could take as many units as they wanted. Later work by Geier and Rozin also found default-standard-unit effects in estimates of body weight and meal calories. These studies support sensitivity to salient units, but they do not prove that every default package, batch, or interface unit causes the same effect in every domain. — CB-EVID-e2340281861797df3c0c. Archived evidence status: supported by experimental studies; strongest evidence here concerns consumption and unit-size judgments. The original unit-bias paper reported experiments in which changing the size of a food unit or serving tool changed how much people selected or consumed even when they could take as many units as they wanted. Later work by Geier and Rozin also found default-standard-unit effects in estimates of body weight and meal calories. These studies support sensitivity to salient units, but they do not prove that every default package, batch, or interface unit causes the same effect in every domain. (Univariate and default standard unit biases in estimation of body weight and caloric content (2009))
- CB-EVID-11b7a0bda76a14156ef7: Unit bias. A new heuristic that helps explain the effect of portion size on food intake — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16771803/
- CB-EVID-e2340281861797df3c0c: Univariate and default standard unit biases in estimation of body weight and caloric content — https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19586254/

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Continued influence effect

ID: MHC-D-5C856E605ED2 · Version: 0.2.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/continued-influence-effect

A correction can win the sentence and still lose the explanation.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Corrections often do help and no single format guarantees complete updating. Do not treat persistence as proof that a person ignored the correction.

### Explanation

False or outdated information can continue to shape later reasoning after it has been corrected. Removing a claim leaves an explanatory gap; if no supported alternative fills the gap, the original story can remain cognitively useful and keep resurfacing.

### Steps

1. State the corrected fact clearly instead of repeating only the false claim.
2. When supported, provide the best alternative explanation that replaces the role the old claim played.

### Example

An outage is first blamed on capacity. Logs later show a configuration error, yet follow-up discussion still explains the incident as 'the capacity problem' unless the corrected causal chain is made explicit.

### Check

After removing the false claim, what explanation is the reader supposed to use instead?

### Limits

- Corrections often do help and no single format guarantees complete updating. Do not treat persistence as proof that a person ignored the correction.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. — CB-EVID-cc3397936a53d6387592. Archived evidence status: well-established persistence after correction; corrections usually still help. The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. (Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing (2012))
- contextualizes: The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. — CB-EVID-668edacadcd6532a8b61. Archived evidence status: well-established persistence after correction; corrections usually still help. The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. (Debunking: A Meta-Analysis of the Psychological Efficacy of Messages Countering Misinformation (2017))
- contextualizes: The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. — CB-EVID-63258186dc15deb7a73d. Archived evidence status: well-established persistence after correction; corrections usually still help. The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. (The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction (2022))
- contextualizes: The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. — CB-EVID-097a3c0239bd2e420aec. Archived evidence status: well-established persistence after correction; corrections usually still help. The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. (Effective correction of misinformation (2023))
- contextualizes: The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. — CB-EVID-45ee9c6103354aabb92d. Archived evidence status: well-established persistence after correction; corrections usually still help. The continued influence effect describes a specific pattern: false or outdated information can keep affecting later reasoning even after a clear correction. It does not mean the correction had no effect, that the person rejected the correction, or that belief in the false claim became stronger. Corrections often reduce misinformation reliance without removing it completely. That distinction matters because continued influence is much broader than the rarer backfire outcome. (Factual corrections: Concerns and current evidence (2024))
- CB-EVID-cc3397936a53d6387592: Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing — https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100612451018
- CB-EVID-668edacadcd6532a8b61: Debunking: A Meta-Analysis of the Psychological Efficacy of Messages Countering Misinformation — https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617714579
- CB-EVID-63258186dc15deb7a73d: The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction — https://doi.org/10.1038/s44159-021-00006-y
- CB-EVID-097a3c0239bd2e420aec: Effective correction of misinformation — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101712
- CB-EVID-45ee9c6103354aabb92d: Factual corrections: Concerns and current evidence — https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2023.101715

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z

---

## Mere urgency effect

ID: MHC-D-B0151C5FFB65 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: concept
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/mere-urgency-effect

Urgent can be just a loud sticker on a small task.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261113-0d6697fd
Source corpus commit: 0d6697fd15f7fb670cfa465c54a411e91752cae4
Source manifest SHA-256: 038080ffd768d7c1ae21ae65ea2a3b8e36664c28df759e06d19f63f6e059bf29
Source projection SHA-256: 489520d20496b8e53d4bcf37ddaae13d1b66f4405e33ae1666ce681073b24c78

### Avoid when

- Real emergencies, production incidents, medical risks, and hard external deadlines are not cognitive illusions. The issue is urgency without matching value.

### Explanation

The mere urgency effect appears when a short deadline pulls attention toward a lower-value task. The clock changes what feels important even when it changes none of the underlying payoff.

### Steps

1. Score importance and urgency separately.
2. Imagine both deadlines disappeared. Which task would create more value?
3. Protect time for important work before opening channels designed to manufacture urgency.

### Example

A low-value message expires in an hour while a high-value analysis has no flashing deadline. The message feels harder to ignore, although the analysis matters more.

### Check

If both tasks had the same deadline, which one would you do first?

### Limits

- Real emergencies, production incidents, medical risks, and hard external deadlines are not cognitive illusions. The issue is urgency without matching value.

### Evidence and sources

- contextualizes: Zhu, Yang and Hsee (2018) reported five experiments in which people sometimes chose objectively lower-payoff tasks when those tasks had short, spurious completion windows, even after several ordinary reasons for prioritizing urgent work were controlled. An independent replication accepted in 2026 tested the effect with 2,374 participants across a close replication, additional confound controls, a fresh-eyes redesign and a meta-analytic synthesis. The effect became smaller as design confounds were removed but remained significant in the tests intended to isolate illusory urgency. This supports the phenomenon in the tested task-allocation paradigms without implying that every short deadline is irrational or that urgency never contains useful information. — CB-EVID-0560184e1aa4b8c8667f. Archived evidence status: supported by five original experiments and a large independent replication; the effect attenuates under additional controls but remains detectable. Zhu, Yang and Hsee (2018) reported five experiments in which people sometimes chose objectively lower-payoff tasks when those tasks had short, spurious completion windows, even after several ordinary reasons for prioritizing urgent work were controlled. An independent replication accepted in 2026 tested the effect with 2,374 participants across a close replication, additional confound controls, a fresh-eyes redesign and a meta-analytic synthesis. The effect became smaller as design confounds were removed but remained significant in the tests intended to isolate illusory urgency. This supports the phenomenon in the tested task-allocation paradigms without implying that every short deadline is irrational or that urgency never contains useful information. (The Mere Urgency Effect (2018))
- contextualizes: Zhu, Yang and Hsee (2018) reported five experiments in which people sometimes chose objectively lower-payoff tasks when those tasks had short, spurious completion windows, even after several ordinary reasons for prioritizing urgent work were controlled. An independent replication accepted in 2026 tested the effect with 2,374 participants across a close replication, additional confound controls, a fresh-eyes redesign and a meta-analytic synthesis. The effect became smaller as design confounds were removed but remained significant in the tests intended to isolate illusory urgency. This supports the phenomenon in the tested task-allocation paradigms without implying that every short deadline is irrational or that urgency never contains useful information. — CB-EVID-cb913158ea92a4b9fe83. Archived evidence status: supported by five original experiments and a large independent replication; the effect attenuates under additional controls but remains detectable. Zhu, Yang and Hsee (2018) reported five experiments in which people sometimes chose objectively lower-payoff tasks when those tasks had short, spurious completion windows, even after several ordinary reasons for prioritizing urgent work were controlled. An independent replication accepted in 2026 tested the effect with 2,374 participants across a close replication, additional confound controls, a fresh-eyes redesign and a meta-analytic synthesis. The effect became smaller as design confounds were removed but remained significant in the tests intended to isolate illusory urgency. This supports the phenomenon in the tested task-allocation paradigms without implying that every short deadline is irrational or that urgency never contains useful information. (Brief commentary: an independent republication study of the Mere Urgency Effect (2026))
- CB-EVID-0560184e1aa4b8c8667f: The Mere Urgency Effect — https://academic.oup.com/jcr/article-abstract/45/3/673/4847790
- CB-EVID-cb913158ea92a4b9fe83: Brief commentary: an independent republication study of the Mere Urgency Effect — https://nottingham-repository.worktribe.com/output/68194012

Review: agent · Agent check of the archived evidence review; no independent human review claimed · 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
Published: 2026-11-13T05:54:13Z
