# Block secrets before they become repository history

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Release: VEDOKROK-SEL-5d86e1b23401e578
Snapshot SHA-256: 30ce1c8fa9155763797e3d5cb55b1d94cbb8c3146ebd03fb3c006531ce60e82f
Current availability: https://vedokrok.com/data/availability.json
Current notices: https://vedokrok.com/data/notices.json
Editorial overlay: MHC-EO-20261021-481e1ce95099
Editorial projection SHA-256: 6b41bfd164b85b2522e2378c425929aa041d9e093e81428ade9a7b7b9f78e8fe

---

## Block secrets before they become repository history

ID: MHC-D-RESEARCH-0664 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: protocol
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/block-secrets-before-they-become-repository-history

Deleting a secret after merge is slower than never committing it.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261011-9e4b62c5
Source corpus commit: 9e4b62c5648844484b8cc3160f3e168d63a1241b
Source manifest SHA-256: 8cc91f0a764c635a79a18e06e048d3dc7bb1e07ae0fed6bf544c89832c024402
Source projection SHA-256: d03d10dd52b53dec1ed850b7706847ba5b200e60f24c4fbda4518c2004356104

### Use when

- A coding agent may see local configuration, examples or logs containing credentials.

### Avoid when

- Secret scanning has coverage gaps and bypass paths; prevention still starts with credential handling and least privilege.

### Explanation

Keep real secrets out of prompts and repositories, and enable pre-push or equivalent secret detection where available. Exclude sensitive files from agent context when the tool supports it. If a detector fires, remove the credential from the change and investigate why it entered the agent's path.

### Steps

1. Secrets stored outside source.
2. Sensitive context exclusions configured.
3. Pre-push scanning enabled where available.
4. Blocked secret investigated.
5. Bypasses are exceptional and reviewed.

### Example

A generated test accidentally includes a live API token; push protection blocks the commit and the team replaces it with a test fixture.

### Check

Supported secrets are stopped before the protected repository receives them.

### Limits

- Secret scanning has coverage gaps and bypass paths; prevention still starts with credential handling and least privilege.

### Evidence and sources

- supports: GitHub push protection can block supported secret patterns before they reach protected repositories, while GitHub notes that scanning coverage has limits. — RS-5513871E336DE735. Not all secrets or encodings are detected, and bypass mechanisms exist. (What is push protection; supported behavior)
- supports: OWASP's current secure-coding-with-AI guidance treats repository content, issues, PRs, comments, fetched pages, logs and tool responses as potential indirect prompt-injection inputs for coding agents. — RS-1C68AE8325C384C0. Threat likelihood depends on who can influence the content and what permissions the agent has. (Indirect Prompt Injection in the Development Loop)
- RS-5513871E336DE735: Push protection — https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/secret-security/push-protection
- RS-1C68AE8325C384C0: Secure Coding with AI Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Coding_with_AI_Cheat_Sheet.html

### Vedokrok editorial review

Know where secret protection blocks the change

A blocked push can keep a secret out of the remote repository. It does not undo a local commit or retract data already sent to a model or log.

#### Put checks before each disclosure

Keep real credentials out of source and agent context. Use a local pre-commit check when the goal is to stop a credential entering local Git history, and verify which remote push-protection paths are enabled. GitHub also documents protection for some web and API writes; do not assume every entry path has the same coverage.

#### Clean the affected history before retrying

Suppose a generated fixture contains a live token and the command-line push is blocked. Replace the token with a non-secret fixture and remove it from the affected commits, not only the latest file. Investigate whether it reached another destination. If genuinely exposed, follow the provider’s revocation or rotation procedure. Detection supports credential hygiene; it does not replace it.

**Editorial takeaway:** For the next blocked push, check every reported location and the path that exposed the value. Never use a real credential just to test whether a scanner will catch it.

#### Editorial evidence

- supports: GitHub push protection blocks detected secrets during supported push or hosted-write paths, including command-line pushes and GitHub UI commits. — RS-5513871E336DE735. Selected official documentation read on 2026-10-04. The local-commit distinction concerns command-line Git; the draft preserves the documented UI-commit exception. (What is push protection?; How push protection works)
- limits: Push protection has configuration-dependent coverage and documented bypass or exemption paths. — RS-5513871E336DE735. Selected Types of push protection and Push protection bypass and alerts sections read on 2026-10-04. No live scanner or repository configuration was tested. (Types of push protection; Push protection bypass and alerts)
- supports: Removing a secret from the latest file can leave it in Git history, and an exposed credential requires invalidation or replacement. — RS-6A6591C8A0A9FDD9. Selected official sections read on 2026-10-04. Response order remains provider-specific; a blocked push alone does not establish that there was external exposure. (What are secrets?; How secrets get exposed)
- contextualizes: OWASP advises keeping secrets outside project files that AI tools can read. — RS-1C68AE8325C384C0. Section 9 read on 2026-10-04. This supports context minimization, not a claim that GitHub push protection controls prompts or logs. (Prompt Context Leakage and Sensitive Code Exposure, Do)
- RS-5513871E336DE735: Push protection — https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/secret-security/push-protection
- RS-6A6591C8A0A9FDD9: Secret leakage risks — https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/secret-security/secret-leakage-risks
- RS-1C68AE8325C384C0: Secure Coding with AI Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Coding_with_AI_Cheat_Sheet.html

Editorial version: 1.0.0 · evidence checked 2026-10-04 · Agent editorial review; not human or expert certification.

No review details supplied.
Related (use_before): https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/rotate-an-exposed-credential-even-after-the-text-is-removed
