# Keep CI agents away from production secrets they do not need

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Release: VEDOKROK-SEL-5d86e1b23401e578
Snapshot SHA-256: 30ce1c8fa9155763797e3d5cb55b1d94cbb8c3146ebd03fb3c006531ce60e82f
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## Keep CI agents away from production secrets they do not need

ID: MHC-D-RESEARCH-0668 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: principle
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/keep-ci-agents-away-from-production-secrets-they-do-not-need

A pull request can become an instruction channel to a privileged deputy.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261011-9e4b62c5
Source corpus commit: 9e4b62c5648844484b8cc3160f3e168d63a1241b
Source manifest SHA-256: 8cc91f0a764c635a79a18e06e048d3dc7bb1e07ae0fed6bf544c89832c024402
Source projection SHA-256: d03d10dd52b53dec1ed850b7706847ba5b200e60f24c4fbda4518c2004356104

### Use when

- An AI review or fix bot runs on pull-request content with broad CI credentials.

### Avoid when

- CI products differ in isolation model; inspect the actual runner, token and secret rules.

### Explanation

Give AI-powered CI jobs the minimum token permissions and secrets required for their narrow function. Isolate them from deployment credentials where possible, especially on externally influenced PRs. Separate review/comment capability from push, workflow-edit and deploy capability.

### Example

A PR review bot can read the diff and comment but cannot access production cloud credentials or modify deployment workflows.

### Check

A malicious PR cannot obtain high-impact capability merely because an AI bot reads it.

### Limits

- CI products differ in isolation model; inspect the actual runner, token and secret rules.

### Evidence and sources

- supports: OWASP's current secure-coding-with-AI guidance treats repository content, issues, PRs, comments, fetched pages, logs and tool responses as potential indirect prompt-injection inputs for coding agents. — RS-1C68AE8325C384C0. Threat likelihood depends on who can influence the content and what permissions the agent has. (Indirect Prompt Injection in the Development Loop)
- supports: OWASP treats rules files, build scripts, CI workflows and package lifecycle scripts as security-sensitive control surfaces that deserve heightened review when an agent changes them. — RS-1C68AE8325C384C0. The exact sensitive-file set depends on the repository and build system. (Rules Files; Prompt-to-Code Supply Chain Risk)
- RS-1C68AE8325C384C0: Secure Coding with AI Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Coding_with_AI_Cheat_Sheet.html

No review details supplied.
Related (use_before): https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/require-a-human-decision-before-privileged-workflow-execution
