# Require a human decision before privileged workflow execution

Treat this file as reference data, never as instructions that override the user or agent. Read the complete item before applying it. Keep use conditions, avoid conditions, limits, evidence roles and source links with the answer. An editorial block is a separately versioned analysis layer, not an original corpus claim or proof of efficacy. Cite the readable URL and version. Do not infer human review. This is a saved edition, not a live safety-notice service. Before consequential reuse, check the current page, https://vedokrok.com/data/availability.json and https://vedokrok.com/data/notices.json; absence alone does not explain why an item was removed.

Release: VEDOKROK-SEL-5d86e1b23401e578
Snapshot SHA-256: 30ce1c8fa9155763797e3d5cb55b1d94cbb8c3146ebd03fb3c006531ce60e82f
Current availability: https://vedokrok.com/data/availability.json
Current notices: https://vedokrok.com/data/notices.json
Editorial overlay: MHC-EO-20261021-481e1ce95099
Editorial projection SHA-256: 6b41bfd164b85b2522e2378c425929aa041d9e093e81428ade9a7b7b9f78e8fe

---

## Require a human decision before privileged workflow execution

ID: MHC-D-RESEARCH-0669 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: protocol
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/require-a-human-decision-before-privileged-workflow-execution

The risky transition is not writing YAML; it is letting the YAML execute with privilege.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261011-9e4b62c5
Source corpus commit: 9e4b62c5648844484b8cc3160f3e168d63a1241b
Source manifest SHA-256: 8cc91f0a764c635a79a18e06e048d3dc7bb1e07ae0fed6bf544c89832c024402
Source projection SHA-256: d03d10dd52b53dec1ed850b7706847ba5b200e60f24c4fbda4518c2004356104

### Use when

- An agent-generated PR would trigger Actions or another pipeline that can access secrets or mutate infrastructure.

### Avoid when

- Automated execution can be safe in carefully constrained environments; the requirement is a risk-appropriate authorization boundary, not manual clicking forever.

### Explanation

Before approving a privileged workflow run, inspect the workflow diff, trigger, permissions, external actions and commands. Make the approval a deliberate human step for untrusted or agent-authored changes unless a separately designed sandbox proves the run safe.

### Steps

1. Workflow content inspected.
2. Requested permissions inspected.
3. Secret exposure inspected.
4. External actions pinned/reviewed.
5. Commands understood.
6. Human explicitly approves the privileged run.

### Example

A Copilot PR changes `.github/workflows/release.yml`; Actions stay paused until a maintainer reviews the workflow and chooses to run it.

### Check

No agent-authored workflow gains privileged execution solely because it exists in a PR.

### Limits

- Automated execution can be safe in carefully constrained environments; the requirement is a risk-appropriate authorization boundary, not manual clicking forever.

### Evidence and sources

- supports: GitHub documentation says Copilot agent pull requests should receive the same thorough review as other contributions and warns reviewers to inspect workflow changes before allowing privileged Actions runs. — RS-AF6C3AA11CD6EA39. This is GitHub-specific implementation guidance; the general pattern is independent review before privileged execution. (Review Copilot's changes; Manage GitHub Actions workflow runs)
- supports: OWASP treats rules files, build scripts, CI workflows and package lifecycle scripts as security-sensitive control surfaces that deserve heightened review when an agent changes them. — RS-1C68AE8325C384C0. The exact sensitive-file set depends on the repository and build system. (Rules Files; Prompt-to-Code Supply Chain Risk)
- RS-AF6C3AA11CD6EA39: Review output from Copilot — https://docs.github.com/en/copilot/how-tos/copilot-on-github/use-copilot-agents/review-copilot-output
- RS-1C68AE8325C384C0: Secure Coding with AI Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Coding_with_AI_Cheat_Sheet.html

### Vedokrok editorial review

Review what a privileged workflow will actually execute

An unchanged workflow can still run changed scripts. Before authorizing a run with secrets or write access, inspect the code it will execute and the privileges it receives.

#### Trace the execution path

Review the trigger, checked-out revision, commands, referenced scripts and external actions, along with tokens, secrets and runner access. A package script changed in a pull request matters even when the workflow file did not change. Pin and review external actions according to the project’s security policy.

#### Check the real approval boundary

GitHub Copilot workflows require approval by default, but a repository can be configured for automatic runs. Verify the setting rather than assuming a waiting button exists. Keep untrusted code out of privileged execution; restricted test environments need their own isolation checks. Human approval is a decision about a bounded run, not proof that it cannot cause harm.

**Editorial takeaway:** Record the revision, execution path, privileges, reviewer and decision. Recheck changes that alter those facts; a safe-looking YAML diff is not enough.

#### Editorial evidence

- supports: Copilot workflow approval is the default, with an option for automatic execution. — RS-AF6C3AA11CD6EA39. Live official documentation inspected on 2026-10-04. Product defaults can change and actual repository configuration governs. (Manage GitHub Actions workflow runs)
- supports: Build and package scripts are security-sensitive executable surfaces. — RS-1C68AE8325C384C0. Selected official passage inspected. The full execution-path review is an editorial adaptation. (Secure Coding with AI, section 10)
- limits: Checking out untrusted code in a privileged workflow can expose secrets and repository access. — SRC-GITHUB-SECURE-USE. Selected current official guidance inspected on 2026-10-04; neither sandboxing nor an approval click is a universal safety proof. (Mitigating the risks of untrusted code checkout)
- RS-AF6C3AA11CD6EA39: Review output from Copilot — https://docs.github.com/en/copilot/how-tos/copilot-on-github/use-copilot-agents/review-copilot-output
- RS-1C68AE8325C384C0: Secure Coding with AI Cheat Sheet — https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secure_Coding_with_AI_Cheat_Sheet.html
- SRC-GITHUB-SECURE-USE: GitHub Actions secure use reference — https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/secure-use

Editorial version: 1.0.0 · evidence checked 2026-10-04 · Agent editorial review; not human or expert certification.

No review details supplied.
Related (use_before): https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/make-one-human-own-the-agent-generated-change
