# Run failure-mode analysis before the consequential change

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Editorial overlay: MHC-EO-20261021-481e1ce95099
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## Run failure-mode analysis before the consequential change

ID: MHC-D-RESEARCH-0732 · Version: 0.1.0 · Kind: protocol
Source: https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/run-failure-mode-analysis-before-the-consequential-change

Ask how the process can fail before production teaches you.

Knowledge source release: MHC-RPUB-20261011-9e4b62c5
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### Use when

- You are about to change a process, migration, automation or workflow where one missed failure mode could have a large blast radius.

### Avoid when

- FMEA prioritization numbers are not calibrated probabilities. Use them to structure attention, not simulate certainty.

### Explanation

Walk each important step and list plausible failure modes, their effects, existing controls and detectability. Use rough severity/likelihood/detectability ratings only to prioritize attention. Spend the review on weak controls and hard-to-detect high-impact modes, not on debating a precise risk score.

### Steps

1. At least one high-impact or hard-to-detect failure mode has a stronger prevention, detection or recovery control.

### Example

Bulk update: wrong selection filter → thousands of unintended records → current control: manual review → detection: after activation → safeguard: pre-run count and sampled IDs.

### Check

At least one high-impact or hard-to-detect failure mode has a stronger prevention, detection or recovery control.

### Limits

- FMEA prioritization numbers are not calibrated probabilities. Use them to structure attention, not simulate certainty.

### Evidence and sources

- supports: FMEA is a prospective method for identifying possible failure modes and considering their effects before or during process improvement. — RS-D8547C3B32436378. Priority scores are heuristics; they should not be mistaken for calibrated failure probabilities. (Description and uses)
- RS-D8547C3B32436378: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis — https://digital.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-and-resources/evaluation-resources/workflow-assessment-health-it-toolkit/all-workflow-tools/fmea-analysis

### Vedokrok editorial review

Follow failure-mode analysis through to checked actions

Finding a risk is useful; improving one safeguard does not settle all the other risks. Keep each priority failure mode connected to an owner, an action and a follow-up check.

#### Describe the failure before scoring it

For a bounded process, involve people who understand its important steps. Record how each step could fail, its effects, likely causes and the controls already in place. Consider severity, likelihood and how early the failure would be noticed. Ratings help order the discussion; they are not calibrated probabilities or a substitute for judgment.

#### Track what the review changes

For each mode selected for action, name the change, owner, due point and evidence to collect. Record the result when the action is completed, then reconsider the risk. For a bulk import, one check might reject a wrong account filter before writes begin; separately track a possible duplicate write. Do not close both risks because only the filter check improved.

**Editorial takeaway:** Before calling the review complete, inspect the actions and unresolved risks across its stated scope. FMEA requires informed judgment and can miss or misrank risks; this compact aid is not a replacement for a qualified safety review.

#### Editorial evidence

- supports: The AHRQ FMEA procedure defines the scope, examines failure modes and controls, assigns action owners and deadlines, then records completion results and revises ratings. — RS-D8547C3B32436378. Selected official procedure inspected on 2026-10-04. The import example and per-mode follow-up wording are editorial adaptations of the action and result steps. (How do I use this tool?, steps 1–14, especially 13–14)
- limits: The guidance expects some training or experience and warns that the method is not foolproof in identifying highest risk or action priority. — RS-D8547C3B32436378. Ordinal ratings organize attention; no numerical score is presented as measured risk or evidence that all failure modes were found. (Expertise Required; Disadvantages)
- RS-D8547C3B32436378: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis — https://digital.ahrq.gov/health-it-tools-and-resources/evaluation-resources/workflow-assessment-health-it-toolkit/all-workflow-tools/fmea-analysis

Editorial version: 1.0.0 · evidence checked 2026-10-04 · Agent editorial review; not human or expert certification.

No review details supplied.
Related (useful_with): https://vedokrok.com/knowledge/prefer-a-system-strengthening-action-over-another-reminder
