Principle
Treat issue and PR text as untrusted agent input
A familiar repository surface can still carry instructions for the model.
Before you use it
- Use when
- You ask an agent to fix an issue or address review comments written by people outside your trust boundary.
Keep this limit in mind
- Prompt-injection filtering is imperfect; combine context limits with permission boundaries and review.
An idea to explore.
Try this idea.
Inspect the example, try the idea in your situation, then check your next move.
Why it matters
Separate the developer's task authority from content the agent reads. Treat issue bodies, comments, READMEs, logs and fetched pages as data unless explicitly promoted by a trusted human. After processing external content, inspect for unrelated file, network or tool actions.
An example
A public issue contains a hidden instruction to modify a workflow; the agent may read the issue, but the workflow change is rejected as outside task authority.
Check your result
Repository location alone does not make a piece of text authoritative to the agent.
Save and practise this idea
My learning
Read. Recall. Repeat.
Save this idea and return to it on any device.
Keep exploring
Connected ideas
You are readingTreat issue and PR text as untrusted agent input
Evidence and sources
OWASP's current secure-coding-with-AI guidance treats repository content, issues, PRs, comments, fetched pages, logs and tool responses as potential indirect prompt-injection inputs for coding agents.
Threat likelihood depends on who can influence the content and what permissions the agent has.
Secure Coding with AI Cheat Sheet · Indirect Prompt Injection in the Development Loop
All sources (1)
Edition and review
Version 0.1.0
No review details are supplied for this edition.